Thursday, February 21, 2019
Globalization and the Asian Financial Crisis
globalization and the Asian Financial Crisis The Asian    monetary crisis is a prime example of an  sparing meltdown and it exemplifies the  exits   orbiculateization has during  time of widespread economic downturn. According to the Oxford English Dictionary,  globularization is the integration of theme economies into the international  economic system through trade,   egressside direct  locatement (FDI),  groovy  come downs, migration and the spread of technology.  The global economy is becoming further inter-twined and therefore it is  rattling difficult to stop the  doings of an economic crisis.The Asian financial crisis was a major economic crisis that spread through come on several Asian countries. The  get of the Asian financial crisis can be traced  tolerate to July 2, 1997, with  numerous  accept the  find of the crisis was triggered in  Siameseland (King 439). On this  daylight, the  Tai  governing  spoiled their currency, the Thai  baht, and it  withal went to the Internat   ional  fiscal Fund (IMF) for technical assistance.  One by  oneness, sou-east Asian countries  such as Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and Japan saw their economies  butt in in the wake of heavy foreign investment.An economic boom had  do the region an attractive investment proposition for investors for much of the 1990s. From 1990 to 1997, the private  majuscule flow to developing countries rose  more than fivefold, from US $42  cardinal in 1990 to US $256 billion in 1997 (King 441). However, in the summer of 1997, the economic climate changed, on July 2, 1997, the Thai Baht fell around 20% against the US Dollar (King 441). This was seen as the trigger for the crisis, as investors grew nervous, which led to disinvestments on the Baht, resulting into domestic  output and development stalling.The reason why this was happening was because  galore(postnominal) corporations depended on foreign investment and when they dried up, the businesses could not meet their debt repayments,  take    to m any firms folding across Asia. Within a week of that day in July, the Philippines and Malaysian  brasss were heavily intervening to defend their currencies. Soon  opposite East Asian countries became involved Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and  early(a)s to varying degrees. As global integration was spreading and growing rapidly, the markets were opening up and becoming more liberalized.This enabled these countries to get a huge influx of foreign  groovy. These countries were targeted by investors because they were  classified advertisement as emerging markets, meaning that they had rapid growth and industrialization (Hanieh 65). Hence, they seemed to be ideal for investors as they  desire after high profits and yields. It  essential be emphasized that most of the inflows that came were for  pitiful term portfolio investment purposes.  hugger-mugger  detonator inflows coming into the emerging markets were $42 billion, which  sum upd to a  enormous $256 billion in 1997 (Hanieh 70   ).Ironically, that peak was the same year as the markets  bashed. As mentioned  previously, most of the inflows were for portfolio purposes therefore, the  entrepot markets were experiencing high booms and estate prices were also on the rise.  just  near of the countries had their currency  pinging loosely against the US dollar in the  cater up to the crisis. The informal pegs to the US dollar encouraged  enceinte inflows due to the  enceinte  have-to doe with  yard differential. This though, attracted problems too, due to the predictable nominal  pass judgment, it encouraged unhedged  external borrowing.This asset boom  act to grow and the flow of credit continued to increase. This resulted into Japan, who was already suffering from their lost-decade, into depreciating their currency (Hanieh 74). As a result, this  determine their currency weaker and doing so, it made the exports of the South-Eastern countries uncompetitive. This was damaging to the rest of the countries to integra   te on a global scale. Most of the functions that these countries undertake are producing  references of a production that would be later assembled and completed in countries like Japan or China.As stated earlier, these tiger-economies operated in a fixed  step in rate system therefore, their  telephone exchange banks  inquireed to keep enough reserves so that they could support the Baht at the fixed exchange rate. As the central banks ploughed money in to support their currency to  primary(prenominal)tain the exchange rate, business confidence was shattered and spread across other countries. The  operation of this was further felt as their exports were much dearer since Japan devalued their currency. The knock-on effect was that foreign investors started to take their money out.Thailand was the major casualty of this and it quickly passed onto its neighbours thus, the start of the Asian financial crisis. The financial crisis heavily affected three main emerging economies in the glob   al market Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea (Hanieh 64). These were the hot-bed for foreign investors who sought high returns on their investments. As the fixed currency fell, the more the investors pulled out thus, worsening the currency further. The central banks tried in vain to  harbor the exchange rates as the Thai  giving medication spent $23 billion buying the Baht to  take for to US dollar peg (King 440).Investors sank money into these economies without knowing the full extent of policies involved therefore, as the  mount hidden information of the Thai economy came to surface, it resulted in many  wondering(a) attacks on the Thai Baht, which finally forced the central bank of Thailand to float the Baht as it was no longer able to defend the itself against the US Dollar. It can be argued that the uncertainty, which is the absence of quality information on which to  can investment decisions had incr locomote the investment risk. This resulted in a contagion effect to other A   sian countries.Much of the  mental unsoundness in the economy of Thailand was brought about by heavy short-term borrowing that required debt maintenance. The Thai government attempted to shore up shaky investor confidence by formally backing the financial institutions that were heavily indebted aboard. By October 27, 1997 the crisis had spread  world-wide and had an impact on a global scale (Prakash 127). On that day, it  create a substantial response from Wall Street with the Dow Jones falling by 554. 26 points (or 7. 18%), its biggest point fall in history, causing stock exchange  scoreicials to suspend trading (Prakash 128).There are several  mentations as to why the Asian financial crisis occurred. One of the clearest problems that can be seen is that of their financial systems. It has been evident that because the  abrupt influx of capital flows, the financial systems were not  sure-footed of handling the vast amounts. The weak financial systems led to poor investments and  lus   h risks. Negligent oversight of corporations caused consequences in economic downturns that were not a  fretting in the mid-nineties boom. The macroeconomic policies of the South-East Asian countries made their economies  penetrable to the uncertain confidence of their foreign investors.However, many economists argue that market overreaction and herding caused the  immerge of exchange rates, asset prices and economic activity to be more  repellant than warranted by the initial weak economic conditions. Also, the deeper roots of the economic crisis went back to the early 1990s. Throughout the 1990s, growth in South-East Asia attracted huge capital flows. The account shortfall of Thailand had grown from 5. 7% in 1993 to 8. 5% in 1996 (Khan, Islam, Ahmed 177). This was worsened as the domestic production slowed as the account deficit represented an  so far greater percentage.Much of the instability in the Thailand economy was caused by heavy short term borrowing and as previously state   d the government spent a lot of their reserves to maintain the exchange rate. This created a false sense of security in  pretense the economy was stable. However, this support of the highly leveraged private sector by the Thai government lent the appearance of stability towards an unstable system and attracted even more foreign loans. In February 1997, the Thai company Somprasong was unable to make maintenance payments on its high levels of foreign debt.In the face of such instability, Finance One, the largest finance company in Thailand, failed at the end of  may (Khan, Islam, Ahmed 182). Most of the lending by the company was made up of  inquisitive loans for real estate and stock market margin investment. This political instability resulted in the resignation of the Thai Finance Minister thus, worsening the situation. The  notional attacks on the Baht forced Thailand to let the currency float on July 2, 1997, a  primordial date in the Asian financial crisis. As an after effect, t   he currency depreciated further devastated the Thai economy.This forced the Thai government to call on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for economic help. In August 1997, Thailand was the first  awkward to seek help and the IMF ap be a loan for $3. 9 billion (Glassman 126). However, the IMF gave stipulations that the government had to  come out. These were maintaining a level of government reserves, increasing the VAT, government cuts and a reorganisation of the financial sector. As the Baht declined sharply, a second bail-out was approved. Indonesia and South Korea also approached the IMF for financial assistance.another(prenominal) key element that caused the crisis was that in a lot of East Asian countries the capital account was liberalized for inward and outward flows for foreign investors however, domestic investors could not invest aboard and this meant they could not diversify their risks. Throughout these countries, financial institutions were inadequate. They had poor    prudential  trouble of currency risks, credit evaluation and public financial reporting. ascent global credit and liquidity fed vast amounts of capital to  poorly regulated institutions. Those had limited transparency and poor due diligence from foreign lenders.The poor macroeconomic policies failed to manage these problems and left the countries vulnerable to shocks in many ways. Firstly, widening current account deficits, financed by short-term debt, exposed the economies to sudden reversals in capital flows. Secondly, weaknesses in the under-regulated financial sector fuelled risky lending. A further problem with exacerbated the crisis was the tendency for the government to intervene and bail out floundering companies. These guarantees put further pressure on the global market as the level of debt kept escalating.Together with the depreciating of the currency meant foreign debt proved to be too much of a burden. A further half mask effect was evident between the economies. As th   e currency of the country depreciated, this had a negative effect on the competitiveness of other countries. Therefore, as the Thai Baht was tumbling, their goods became competitive and had a negative effect on other currencies, such as the Rupiah of Indonesia and the Ringgit of Malaysia (Glassman 129). After the Baht was put on the  adrift(p) exchange rate, the economy of Thailand started to recover and was able to alleviate their debt earlier than they thought in 2003 (King 459).South Korea did manage to recuperate despite its weak financial system. However, Indonesia was especially hurt by firms going bankrupt and the devaluation of the Rupiah made it harder for them to recover. Monetary and Fiscal policies were tightened as countries fought to cope with the financial panic. The countries also raised interest rates in order to attract foreign currency and increase the price of domestic assets. On the other hand,  high rates meant higher repayments and many could not survive their    debts. Following the Asian financial crisis, Russia, Mexico and genus Argentina all suffered economic collapses (King 61). Another factor that is thought to be one of the reasons for the crisis, the Asian currencies appreciated to levels that were too high leading to a crash in the markets. The IMF gave these countries support during these times and in return they wanted the countries to follow three key elements large official financing packages, structural reforms, and macroeconomic policies that intended to counter the crisis itself (King 463). Structural reforms were seen as the root causes of the crisis. They intervened to shore up institutions and more  eventfully, improved the financial supervision and regulation.Thus, reducing the likelihood of a crisis reoccurring. Other structures were also altered to help the economies in the long run they strengthened competition laws and increased transparency. This would help reduce eradicate corruption.  big policies were harder to i   mplement due to the turbulent market conditions though, after some initial hesitations, nominal and real interest rates fell to pre-crisis levels. However, Indonesias policies steered them off course for a while before it was brought under control in late 1998 (King 464).The Asian financial crisis raised certain important issues that need to be taken into account for the international financial system. It is very important to prevent a crisis from occurring in the first place, because the short term flow of capital can be moved within seconds therefore, prevention is the  outflank sought achievement/target. Transparency is also important to crisis prevention. At the  teetotum of the Asian financial crisis, some unpleasant information was revealed, in particular, on the weaknesses of central banks international reserve positions.The IMF pointed this out as an integral part as closer monitoring of the finance sector could give alerts to any such problems in the future. Another issue t   hat needed to be  canvass after the crisis was that of capital controls. As the countries liberalized the capital accounts, they left many short falls in the regulation of them. Tighter restriction and closer monitoring of the capital flows would have helped the financial institutions to keep greater control. An additional issue that should be noted is what policies the governments used and which ones seemed to be successful in such a crisis.Looking back at the Asian financial crisis, it seems that  financial insurance worked. A period of high interest rates and the market pressures eased and interest rates soon fell below pre-crisis levels. In theory, if monetary policies were implemented earlier, it might have contrasted the spread of the crisis. However, the higher interest rates meant that debt repayments were higher and led to widespread insolvencies. These macroeconomic policies are crucial as they can be implemented to the changing economic conditions. The Asian financial cri   sis has brought a new way of thinking in the world of global finance.There are lessons that were harshly learnt by a few countries however, the  general effect was a global one. In the contemporary world, one country does not stand by itself, global integration has meant that countries are  affiliated and interlinked. Therefore, as we witnessed from the Asian financial crisis, the end result of poor management of financial institutions can have a drastic impact on the world economy. In the current climate, we are facing a global recession, an expected drop in world trade, all this as a result of a credit boom.The government and regulators must learn from the Asian financial crisis and hopefully they will be able to contain the a la mode(p) economic crisis. Works Cited Oxford English Dictionary. Oxford University Press 2010. Web. 18 March 2011. McNally, David. Another World is Possible Globalization & Anti-Capitalism. Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada Arbeiter Ring Publishing. Print. Adam H   anieh. Forum of Hierarchies of a Global Market The South and the Economic Crisis.  Studies in  semipolitical  frugality  raft 83. (2009) 61  81. Print. Michael R. King. Who Triggered the Asian Financial Crisis? Review of International Political Economy Volume 8.  passing 3 (2001) 438  466. Print. Aseem Prakash. The East Asian Crisis and the Globalization Discourse.  Review of International Political Economy Volume 8. Issue 1 (2001) 119  146. Print. Saleheen Khan, Faridul Islam, Syed Ahmed. The Asian Crisis An Economic Analysis of the Causes.  The Journal of Developing Areas Volume 39. Issue 1 (2005) 169  190. Print. Jim Glassman. Economic Crisis in Asia The Case of Thailand.  Economic Geography Volume 77. Issue 2 (2001) 122  147. Print.  
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
 
 
No comments:
Post a Comment